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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WYCOFF CO~IPANY, 
INCORPORATED 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
VT.\II, HAL S. BENNETT, DON-
.\LD 11:\CKING and RAYMOND W. 
GEE, ITS COMMISSIONERS, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Case No. 
9915 
The same designations of the parties will be used herein 
as were used in the Brief of Appellants. The defendants, 
Public Service Commission of Utah, and its Commissioners, 
'"ill he called "Appellants" and Wycoff Company, Incorpor-
ated, a Utah corporation, will be called "Respondent." 
Respondent essentially agrees with Appellants' intro-
ductory statements of the facts. However, some amplifying 
comments are deemed appropriate. 
Although Respondent's Complaint sought to have de-
cb.red unconstitutional all of the Public Utilities Act (Title 
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54, UCA 1953 ), to the extent that the provisions of the lath 
act relate to the regulation or control of motor carriers ( ~ 
was ordered in the 1953 judgment in Newman vs. Publi 
Service Commission, Civil No. 92815, District Court for Sal 
Lake County), Respondent withdrew from this positi01 
below, and does not appeal from the judgment of the Distric 
Court. 
The court below heard and denied ( R. 16) Appellants 
Motion to Dismiss (R. 15), and Respondent's Motion fo1 
Summary Judgment (R. 20-21) was not granted (R. 94) 
At the top of Page 4 of Appellants' Brief, paragraph 7 oJ 
the complaint is quoted, as follows: 
"That the defendants have threatened to requin 
plaintiff to pay substantial penalties and have caused 
criminal citations to be issued against plaintiff, and 
plaintiff's employees, the proceedings under some of 
which are still pending, for plaintiff's alleged failure 
to comply with the requirements of Title 54, Chapter 
6, Utah Code Annotated 1953." 
The foregoing allegations are admitted in paragraph 2 of 
Appellants' Answer ( R. 17). Reference to Wycoff Com-
pany, Incorporated vs. Public Service Commission of Utah, 
et al, 13 Ut 2d, 123, 369 Pac 2d 283, involving assessment of 
a penalty by said Commission against Respondent in the 
amount of $18,500.00 was, as stated by Appellants, assessed 
for violations of the Motor Carrier Act detennined to be 
unconstitutional by the Court below; and collection proceed· 
ings are held in abeyance in the District Court for Salt Lake 
County, pending the outcome of the case at bar. (See Appel· 
lants' Brief, p. 4) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EXCLUSIONARY PROVISIONS OF SEC-
TION 54-6-12 UCA 1953, AS AMENDED, DE4 
NIED TO RESPONDENT CONSTITUTIONAL 
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW WHICH 
DEPRIVED RESPONDENT OF ITS PROPERTY 
\VITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The decision of the trial court that Respondent seeks 
to have a.ffinned is based upon the trial court's findings that 
Respondent was not being accorded equal protection of the 
law in that it belonged to a class that the Motor Carrier 
Act discriminates against. This general proposition is de-
scribed at 12 American Jurisprudence 220, "Constitutional 
Law," Section 525. 
Generally - The theory underlying constitutional 
requirements of equality is that all persons in like 
circumstances and like conditions must be treated 
alike, both as to privileges conferred and as to liabil-
ities or burdens imposed. Any statute which imposes 
special resbictions or burdens on, or grants special 
privileges to, certain persons engaged in a business, 
which burdens or privileges are not imposed on, or 
granted to, other persons engaged in the same busi-
ness under the same circumstances, is invalid. In 
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, no distinction is to 
be observed between the effect of privileges conferred 
and the effect of burdens imposed. A privilege con-
ferred upon one class is a discrimination in favor of 
that class and against all others not similarly endowed 
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4 
just as a burden upon one class is a discriminatio 
against it and in favor of all others not similar! 
afflicted. 
A privilege or a burden is or is not a denial c 
the equal protection of the laws according to wheth€ 
the discrimination relates to a matter upon whic: 
classification is legally permissible and, if so, whethe 
the classification is a reasonable one. 
Respondent relies upon the following constitutional pro 
visions: 
~ ~ ~ nor shall any state ~ ~ ~ deprive any person o 
life, liberty or property without due process of law 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction th1 
equal protection of the laws. (Section 1, Fourteentl 
Amendment, U.S. Constitution) 
All political power is inherent in the people; anc 
all free governments are founded on their authori~ 
for their equal protection and benefit, and they havE 
the right to alter or reform their government as thE 
public welfare may require (Article I, Section 2, Utah 
Constitution) 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. ( A1ticle I, Sec· 
tion 7, Utah Constitution. ) 
All laws of a general nature shall have unifonn 
operation. (Article I, Section 24, Utah Constitution) 
The legislature is prohibited from enacting any 
private or special laws in the following cases: 
16. Granting to an individual, association or cor· 
poration any privilege, immunity or franchise. 
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In all cases where a general law can be applic-
able, no special law shall be enacted. (Article VI, 
Section 26, Utah Constitution) 
Sections 54-6-2, -3, -4, and -5 describe the extent to 
which carriers are to be regulated by Appellant Commis-
sion, declare that all common motor carriers are subject to 
such regulation as "common carriers," and prohibit any trans-
portation operations for hire on the public highways of the 
State. that are not conducted in accordance with said Act. 
Thl'sl' Sections read as follows: 
54-6-2. All motor carriers .subfect to regulation as 
common carriers. - All common motor carriers of 
property or passengers as defined in this act are here-
by declared to be common carriers within the mean-
ing of the public utility laws of this state, and subject 
to this act and to the laws of this state, including the 
regulation of all rates and charges now in force or 
that hereafter may be enacted, pertaining to public 
utilities and common carriers as far as applicable, 
and not in conflict herewith. 
5-t-6-3. Transporting for compensation on public high-
ways. - No common or contract motor carrier shall 
operate any motor vehicle for the transportation of 
either persons or property for compensation on any 
public highway in this state except in accordance with 
the provisions of this act. 
54-6--!. Common motor carriers- Powers and duties 
of commission. - The commission is vested with 
P?wer and authority, and it shall be its duty, to super-
VIse and regulate all common motor carriers and to 
fix, alter, regulate and determine just, fair, reasonable 
and sufficient rates, fares, charges and classifications; 
to regulate the facilities, accounts, service and safety 
of operations of each such common motor carrier, to 
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regulate operating and time schedules so as to meet 
the needs of any community, and so as to insure ade-
quate transportation service to the territory traversed 
by such common motor carriers, and so as to prevent 
unnecessary duplication of service between these 
common motor carriers, and between them and the 
line of competing steam and electric railroads; and 
the commission may require the coordination of the 
service and schedules of competing common carriers 
by motor vehicles or electric and steam railroads; to 
require the filing of annual and other reports, tariffs, 
schedules and other data by such common motor 
carriers and the public and between such common 
motor carriers and other common carriers, to the end 
that the provisions of this chapter may be fully and 
complete!J carried out. The commission shall have 
power and authority, by general order or otherwise, 
to prescribe rules and regulations in conformity with 
this act applicable to any and all such common motor 
carriers, and to do all things necessary to carry out 
and enforce the provisions of this act. All laws relat· 
ing to the powers, duties, authority and jurisdiction 
of the commission over common carriers are hereby 
made applicable to all such common motor carriers 
except as herein otherwise specifically provided. (Em· 
phasis added. ) 
54-6-5. Intrastate commerce- Certificate of conveni-
ence and necessity. - It shall be unlawful for any 
common motor carrier to operate as a carrier in in~a­
state commerce within this state without first havmg 
obtained from the commission a certificate of con· 
venience and necessity.' ' ' 
Section 54-6-18, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, stipulates 
that every carrier or person who violates any provision of 
the Motor Carrier Act is guilty of a misdemeanor; and Sec· 
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[)1l 54-7-25, et seq, provide other penalties for failure to 
>mply with any part of Title 54, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
y excluding certain motor carriers from general regulation 
f the Public Service Commission, Section 54-6-12 establishes 
rivileged classes which are not subject to the following type 
f general regulation by the Commission: 
1. They do not have to obtain Certificates of Conveni-
nce and Necessity (Section 54-6-5) or Contract Carrier 
1ermits (Section 54-6-9). 
2. They are not regulated as to rates and classifications 
Section 54-6-11 ) . 
3. They are not subject to regulation in transferring 
:ertificates or permits in the event of transfer or death of the 
•wner (Section 54-6-24). 
4. They do not have to obtain temporary or emergency 
~nnits when the need arises (Section 54-6-10). 
5. They are not regulated pertaining to their accounts 
md records, including methods of depreciation (Section 54-
l-23, -24). 
6. They are not regulated concerning keeping records 
md books available within the state and subject to inspec-
tion (Section 54-7-8 ) . 
7. They do not have to keep and maintain a schedule 
of rates and charges as condition precedent to doing business 
(Section 54-3-6 and 54-7-12). 
8. H they are a corporation, they are not regulated as to 
declaration and payment of dividends (Section 54-4-27). 
9. They are not forbidden to discriminate in services 
rendered or rates charged (Section 54-3-8). 
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The foregoing list does not purport to be an exhaustive 
one by any means, but is simply set forth to illustrate what 
is involved in being subject to general regulation and not 
being so subjected. 
It may be of assistance to point out that Section 54-2-1 
( 28) defines the term "public utility" to include every "com-
mon carrier." Section 54-6-2 provides that all motor carriers 
"as defined in this act are hereby declared to be common 
carriers within the meaning of the public utility laws." Sec-
tion 54-6-12 provides that "no portion of this act shall apply" 
to those carriers excluded from general regulation of the 
Public Service Commission, "except for the provisions of 
54-6-17 relative to the requirements of insurance, 54-6-21 
relative to safety regulations, and 54-6-22 relative to acci-
dent reports." It should be borne in mind that, although the 
next to last paragraph of 54-6-12 gives the Commission 
power to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations to carry 
out the purposes of the act, any such rules and regulations 
are limited only to matters of insurance, safety regulations 
and accident reports, as provided. The power to regulate ex-
empt carriers is limited to the stated exceptions, namely, gen-
eral regulation of insurance, safety regulations and accident 
reports. 
The District Court found, and Respondent contends, 
that this causes the entire motor carrier act contained in 
Chapter 6, Title 54, Utah Code Annotated 1953, to be un· 
constitutional. The correct rule is stated in 11 American 
Jurisprudence 855, "Constitutional Law" Section 161, dealing 
with striking out unconstitutional exceptions: 
One important class of cases in which qu~stions 
as to the severability of valid and invalid port1~ns of 
an act and the determination of the legislative mtent 
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are involved consists of statutes containing invalid ex-
ceptions or provisos. The general rule is that if. such a 
proviso operates to limit the scope of the act m su.ch 
a mannt'r that by striking out the proviso, the remam-
der of the statute would have a broader scope either 
as to subject or territory, then the whole act is invalid, 
bt'cause such extended operation would not be in 
accordance with the legislative intent. 
:n other words, if the court were to strike out the exceptions 
~tained in 54-6-12, the remainder of the Motor Carrier Act 
would be broader, the result would not be as intended by 
:he legislature, which has a predominance of rural legislators, 
md the whole act would be invalid. 
The quotation from 11 Am. Jur. 855 continues at 
page 866: 
Instances of the application of this rule may be 
found in the case of statutes prohibiting trusts or 
combinations to fix prices or restrict the production of 
articles of commerce, but excepting from the prohibi-
tions all persons engaged in agriculture or horticul-
ture; 0 o 0 , and the courts may properly infer that it 
would not have been enacted if such group had not 
been excluded from its operation and protected from 
its provisions. 
The recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
which have held that failure of state legislatures to reappor-
tion themselves to be no longer without a federal judicial 
remedy, points up one of the political facts of life of the 
twentieth century: State Legislatures are controlled by 
rural areas although the rural population comprises a minor-
ity. It would be possible to infer that the exclusionary 
provisions of the 1935 Motor Carrier Act were inserted 
to satisfy the farm lobby and other politically-favored 
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groups who were more effective than others in escaping 
regulation. As the Court is aware, the Third District Court 
' for Salt Lake County, by and through Judge Joseph G. 
Jeppson, declared not only the Motor Carrier Act but all 
of the Public Utilities Act unconstitutional, to the extent that 
the provisions of the latter act related to the regulation or 
control of motor carriers ( R. 7-11). Although this case was 
appealed to the Supreme Court, it was dismissed on June 3, 
1953, upon the motion of the Public Service Commission 
( R.l7, paragraph 2). Respondent does not now contend the 
Public Utilities Act (Title 54) to be unconstitutional because 
the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 was merely amendatory of the 
1917 Public Utility Act. Smith vs. Cahoon, 283 US 553, 75 
L. 2d. 1264 was the principal authority relied upon in the 
Newman case, and it involved a Florida motor carrier regu· 
latory act with exclusions held to be constitutionally defec· 
tive under the equal protection clause of the 14th Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution. The exclusions from the 
Florida statute was quoted in the opinion (p. 1269), as 
follows: 
0 0 0 Provided, That the term 'auto transportation 
company' as used in this act shall not include corpora· 
tions or persons engaged exclusively in the transporta· 
tion of children to or from school, or any transporta· 
tion company engaged exclusively in the transporting 
of agricultural, horticultural, dairy, or other farm 
products with fresh and salt fish and oysters ~nd 
shrimp from the point of production to the assembling 
or shipping point en route to primary ma~ket or to 
motor vehicles used exclusively in transporting or de· 
livering dairy products or any transportation company 
engaged in operating taxicabs, or hotel busses from .a 
depot to a hotel in the same town or city. (EmphasiS 
supplied) 
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Regarding the exclusionary provisions, the Court de-
clared at page 127 4 of 75 L.ed. 
• • • The act provides that the term auto transporta-
tion company, upon which the obligations of the act 
are imposed, shall not include 'any transportation 
company engaged exclusively in the transporting 
agricultural, horticultural, dairy or other farm prod-
ucts and fresh and salt fish and oysters and shrimp 
from the point of production to the assembling or 
shipping point en route to primary market or to motor 
vehicles used exclusively in transporting or delivering 
dairy products.' The point with respect to this dis-
crimination is not that a distinction is made between 
common carriers and private carriers, but between 
private carriers themselves, although they are alike 
engaged in transporting property for compensation 
over public highways between fixed termini or over 
a regular route. 
The holding of the Court (page 127 4) is plain and unequiv-
ocal: 
• • o (T)here does not appear to be the slightest 
justification for making a distinction between those 
who carry for hire farm products, or milk or butter, or 
fish or oysters, and those who carry for hire bread or 
sugar, or tea or coffee, or groceries in general, or other 
useful commodities. So far as the statute was de-
signed to safeguard the public with respect to the 
use of the highways, we think that the discrimination 
it makes between the private carriers which are re-
lieved of the necessity of obtaining certificates and 
giving security, and a carrier such as the appellant, 
was wholly arbitrary and constituted a violation of 
the appellant's constitutional right. Such a classifica-
tion is not based on anything having relation to the 
purpose for which it is made.' (Cases cited. ) 
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The entire Florida act was declared void and unconstitu-
tional and the Utah Motor Carrier Act can have no better 
standing. 
Appellants would have this Court believe that the con-
trolling factor which influenced the court in Smith v. Cahoon 
to declare the Florida motor carrier act unconstitutional was 
that regulated carriers were required to provide a bond or 
insurance and that excepted carriers were not. The opinion 
makes clear that there are other constitutional defects when , 
at page 1274 of 75 L Ed it is stated: 
If we leave on one side the requirement that a certifi-
cate holder, who is a private carrier, shall give a bond 
or policy for the goods carried by him, irrespective 
of his contract with his employer whose goods he 
carries, and if we consider any of the provision for the 
protection of the public with respect to the use of the 
highways, another constitutional difficulty is encoun-
tered, that is, of an unconstitutional discrimination. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
The court held that the Florida act was invalid on its face, 
on page 1272 of 75 LEd: 
The statute on its face makes no distinction between 
common carriers and a private carrier such as the ap· 
pellant. It applies, without any stated exception, to 
every auto transportation company within the statu· 
tory definition, and this admittedly included the ~p­
pellant. It not only required an application force~­
cate of public convenience and necessity but that this 
should be accompanied by a schedule of tariffs,. ~nd 
no such certificate was to be valid without the giVmg 
of a bond by the applicant (t (t (t. 
On the face of the statute, the scheme was obviously 
one for the supervision and control of those carriers 
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which, by reason of the nature of their undertaking 
or business, were subject to regulation by public 
authority in relation to rates and service. 
It is submitted that the unlawful discrimination the court 
found through the failure to protect the public by requiring 
regulated and unregulated carriers to give a bond ar public 
liability insurance was only "another" fatal defect. 
The writer of this brief is well aware that the present 
members of this Court were the authors of the decision in 
Justice vs. Standard Gilsonite, 12 Utah 2d 357, 366 P.2d 
97 .t. This case recently declared unconstitutional the penalty 
provisions of the Utah statute governing payment of wages. 
Section 34-10-6, UCA 1953 provides as follows: 
Section 34-10-2. "None of the provisions of this 
chapter shall apply to the state, or to any county, in-
corporated city or town, or other political subdivision, 
or to employers and employees engaged in farm, 
dairy, agricultural, viticultural or horticultural pur-
suits, or to banks and mercantile houses, or to stock or 
poultry raising, or to household domestic service, or to 
any other employment, where an agreement exists 
between employer and employee providing for differ-
ent terms of payment." 
The opinion specifies: 
The question presented is whether the exclusion of 
"Banks and mercantile houses" makes the act arbi-
trary, discriminatory class legislation. 
The Justice case overruled State v. Walker;) 100 Utah 523, 
116 P 2d 766 as a precedent, as follows: 
In State r. W alker:J a criminal conviction of an em-
ployer for refusal to pay wages due when demanded 
under Chapter 60, Laws of Utah for 1937, where the 
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statutes involved were similar to those involved in 
this action, we held that there is a reasonable basis 
to differentiate banks and mercantile houses from the 
included employers so that the provisions were not 
unconstitutional. We have carefully reconsidered this 
problem and notwithstanding our previous holding in 
the Walker case, we conclude that there is no reas-
onable basis for exclusion of banks and mercantile 
houses from the penalty provisions of this act as dis-
tinguished from other employers which are included, 
and that such provisions are thus reneder unconstitu-
tional. 
Other courts have reached similar holdings. 
Priest v. State Tax Commission, Ky., 80 S.W.2d 43, 
involved an interpretation of the Kentucky act regulating 
transportation for hire by motor vehicles. The act exempted: 
Motor vehicles transporting farm products, including 
dairy products and livestock from the farm to point 
of destination, or from any point to the farm, by way 
of the shortest practicable route. 
The court held: 
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of 
Smith v. Cahoon, 2$3 U.S. 553, 51 S. Ct. 582, 75 L. 
Ed. 1264, determined and disposed of what we con-
clude is almost exactly the same question by holding 
that the same attempted classification for exemption 
purposes in the same character of statute offended 
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution and was invalid. The enactment 
there involved was a statute of the state of Florida, 
and which, as we have said, related to the same sub-
ject as do the two domestic statutes above referred to; 
i.e., the regulation of motor transportation vehicles on 
public highways for hire. Among the exempting pro-
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visions in the Florida statute was one 0 0 0 saying: 
(Court quotes). It was attacked by others engaged 
in similar transportation of other freight and products 
not ('mbraced therein upon the same ground as is 
urged by plaintiffs herein. The case found its way to 
the Supreme Court of the United States, and in its 
opinion it sustained the ground of attack because it 
found that the classification that the Florida Legisla-
ture attempted to make was unreasonable, arbitrary, 
and without factual distinction, and was not based on 
anything having relation to the purpose for which it 
was made. 
Other questions are discussed and disposed of in the 
opinion, but on the one now under consideration the 
opinion said, inter alia: "But, in establishing such a 
regulation, there does not appear to be the slightest 
justification for making a distinction between those 
who carry for hire farm products, or milk or butter, or 
fish or oysters, 0 0 0 or tea or coffee, or groceries 
in general, or other useful commodities." The holding 
of the opinion was followed by the United States 
District Court of the Eastern District of South Caro-
lina in Sutt v. Ellerbe, 56 F. 2d 1058, and by the 
United States District Court, District of Kansas, in the 
case of Louis v. Boynton 53 F. 2d 471, wherein the 
same character of exemption was involved in the stat-
ute there under consideration. The holding by the 
federal courts in those opinions has not been departed 
from, although learned counsel for defendants insist 
that they have lately manifested an inclination to do 
so. The cases cited in support of that suggestion do 
not involve the questions now under consideration, 
but dealt only with the right of a state to enact police 
regulations with reference to motor vehicles engaged 
in interstate commerce, and are therefore not applic-
able here. 
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The court concluded, by distinguishing cases later to Smith 
v. Cahoon, as follows: 
The same counsel also rely upon the cases of Contin-
ental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352,52 S. Ct. 
595, 596,76 L. Ed. 1155, 81 ALR 1402, and Hicklin v. 
Covey, 290 U.S. 169, 54 S. Ct. 142, 144, 78 L.Ed. 247. 
In the Woodring Case the exemption was: "The trans-
portation of livestock and farm products to market 'by 
the owners thereof or supplies for his own use in his 
own motor vehicle.'" The Supreme Court referred to 
its prior opinion in the Cahoon Case, supra, and, in 
distinguishing the exemption there involved from the 
one then being considered, the opinion said: "The 
distinction in the instant case is of a different sort. 
The statute does not attempt to impose an arbitrary 
discrimination between carriers who transport prop-
erty for hire, or compensation, with respect to the 
class of products they carry. The exemption runs 
only to one who is carrying his own livestock and 
farm products to market or supplies for his own use in 
his own motor vehicle." The exemption of the Kansas 
statute then under consideration was upheld. 
In the Hicklin Case the exemption in the statute was: 
"Farmers or dairymen, hauling dairy or farm products; 
or lumber haulers engaged in transporting lumber and 
logs from the forest to the shipping points." The 
Supreme Court, in upholding it, adverted to the fact 
that the particular excepted transportation was known 
to be seasonable, in that it was not constant the year 
round. But it furthermore said that: "The exemption 
here is further limited by the fact that it can apply 
only to one whose principal business is that of a 
farmer or dairyman and not to one merely incidentally 
engaged in farming or dairying." That language was 
taken with approval from the opinion of the Supreme 
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Court of South Carolina. In neither the Woodring 
nor the Hicklin opinions of the Supreme Court was 
there anv modification of its opinion in the prior 
Cahoon Case, supra. On the contrary, in each of 
them is was expresly referred to, and the distinction 
between the statute there involved and the ones 
involved in the Woodring and Hicklin Cases was 
pointed out. 
These same distinctions apply to these cases now which 
are cited in Appellant's brief. 
As hereinbefore seen, exemption 3 of the 1934 act, 
which is the subject matter of attack by plaintiffs, is 
not limited or extended to the farmer, or the dairy-
man, or the producer of any of the articles therein 
mentioned in hauling his products to market by em-
ploying his own truck, as was true in the Woodring 
and Hicklin Cases; but, on the contrary, the exemp-
tion runs alone to not merely agricultural and dairy 
products, but to such products when, and only when, 
being transported from the farm to the point of des-
tination by one who is regularly engaged in the motor 
transportation business for compensation, as are the 
plaintiffs in this action. We can see no escape from 
the conclusion announced by the Supreme Court in 
the Cahoon Case or any way by which it may be 
avoided. Indeed, the Legislature itseH was necessar-
itly doubtful of the proposition, since it expressly 
enacted in the 1934 act that, if the exemption 3 
therein adopted should be declared to be unconstitu-
tional, "then it is the intention of the legislature that 
the present section ° 0 0 shall remain and be in force," 
and which is exemption "Three" in the 1932 act. 
Since we conclude that there can be no reasonable 
distinction drawn between the statue here involved 
and the one before the Supreme Court in the Cahoon 
Case, it follows that the court erred in upholding the 
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validity of exemption No.3 contained in the 1934 act, 
and which, according to the express provisions of 
that amendment, automatically reinstates exemption 
"Three" of the 1932 act. 
Franchise Motor Freight Assn. v. Seavey, ........ Cal. 
------------, 235 P 1000 (Cal. Sup. Ct. in Bank) was a man-
damus action to compel the State Commission to assume jur-
isdiction over agricultural truckers for hire who had been ex-
cluded from Commission regulation by an amendment to 
the existing act which plaintiffs contended was unconstitu-
tional. The Commission had refused to exercise jurisdiction 
because said amendment excluded "the movement of prod-
ucts or implements of husbandry and other farm necessities 
from farm to farm or from and to farms to and from loading 
point, warehouse or other initial points." 
At page 1002 the opinion states: 
The question, therefore, is whether or not the 
exemption created by the proviso of 1923 constitutes 
a lawful classification. 0 0 0 It is equally well settled 
that a statute makes on improper and unlawful dis-
crimination if it confers particular privileges upon a 
class arbitrarily selected from a larger number of 
persons, all of whom stand in the same relation to the 
privileges granted, and between whom and the per-
sons not so favored no reasonable distinction or sub-
stantial difference can be found justifying the inclu-
sion of the one and the exclusion of the other. 5 Cal 
Jur. 825, and cases cited. 
What reasonable ground of distinction is there 
between a common carrier engaged in the business of 
hauling various kinds of freight, including products 
and implements of husbandry, by motor truck over a 
regular route upon the public highway, and anot?er 
common carrier engaged in the business of hauling 
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freight, which consists solely of the products and im-
plements of husbandry, by motor truck over the same 
route, which justifies the subjection of the one to the 
regulations imposed by the Auto Stage and Truck 
Transportation Act, and the exemption of the other 
from the burden of those regulations? (Emphasis 
added) 
The court concluded: 
0 0 0 we are impelled to conclude that no natural, 
intrinsic, or constitutional distinction is to be found 
as a basis for the exemption of the transportation 
companies described in the 1923 amendment, supra, 
from the regulations described in the 0 0 0 Act, and 
that such attempted exemption is violative of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution 
and of like provisions in our State Constitution. 
The Seavey Case was cited recently with approval by the 
California Supreme Court (en Bane) in Katze vs. County 
of Los Angeles, ............ -Calif ............. 341 P. 2d 310, at 316, 
as follows: 
\\'here the legislative classification is unreasonable, 
the courts will invalidate the law. In Franchise Motor 
Freight Association vs. Seavey ............ Calif ............. , 
235 P 1000 (Cal S. Ct. in Bank) we said that "a 
statute makes an improper and unlawful discrimina-
tion if it confers particular privileges upon a class 
arbitrarily selected from a larger number of persons," 
etc. (as quoted above. ) 
.\s the Florida Act was held invalid in Smith v. Cahoon, 
it is submitted that the Utah Motor Carrier Act is unconsti-
tutional on its face; and, in the language of the Seavey Case, 
what reasonable ground of distinction is there between the 
transportation of sand and gravel, ore, water and minerals 
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(subject to general regulation), and coal, lumber or logs 
(not so regulated); cancelled checks (regulated) and money 
and other valuables (not regulated)? Appellants contend 
that the legislature had good reasons for making these ex-
emptions and cites a number of cases where other jurisdic-
tions have upheld the various exceptions described in sub-
sections (a) through (g) of Section 54-6-12. 
Nearly all of the cases cited by appellants involve the 
construction of taxing statutes imposed for revenue purposes. 
The revenue cases must be distinguished from those involv-
ing regulatory legislation. Chapter 6 of Title 54, UCA 1953 
is strictly a regulatory measure. Justice Cardozo in Aero 
Mayflower Transit Company vs. Georgia Public Service 
Commission, 295 U.S. 285, 79 L.ed. 1439, made this distinc-
tion apparent at 79 LEd 1444 when he declared, after refer-
ring to the plight of Georgia farmers, as indicated in the 
earlier decision of Georgia Supreme Court: 
~ ~ l:t The effect of the exception would be to equalize 
the burden. "Every one knows that as a general rule 
a tax of this kind finally reaches the consumer of the 
product, or user of the service; and hence an exemp· 
tion of carriers of such products is to be taken as an 
exemption of the products themselves, and not of the 
carrier." The enumeration of rational bases of dis-
tinction was not put forward as exhaustive. The 
court expressed the belief that others could be added. 
We think a classification thus designed to ameli-
orate the lot of the producers of farm and dairy pr~­
ucts is not an arbitrary preference within the meamng 
and the condemnation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The plight of the Georgia farmer has been pictured ?Y 
the state court in words already quoted. To free htm 
of fresh burdens might seem to a wise statecraft to be 
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a means whereby to foster agriculture and promote 
thl' common good. The case is a very different one 
from Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 75 L Ed 1264, 
51 S Ct 582. There a Florida statute, similar to this 
one in many of its provisions, gave relief from its 
exactions to any transportation company engaged ex-
clusively in the carriage of agricultural, horitcultural, 
dairy or farm products, whether for the producer or 
for any one else. The attack was not directed, as in 
the case at hand, to an exemption of a particular class 
of carriers upon rational grounds of policy from the 
payment of an annual tax. (Emphasis furnished. ) 
After discussing the cases (also quoted by Appellants 
from this Aero Mayflower Case), the Court's opinion contin-
ues at page 1445 of 79 L. Ed., as follows: 
These cases and others like them (American Su-
gar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 45 LEd 102, 
21 S Ct 43) are illustrations of the familiar doctrine 
that a legislature has a wide discretion in the classifi-
cation of trades and occupations for the purpose of 
taxation and in the allowance of exemptions and de-
ductions within reasonable limits. (Emphasis is mine) 
and nails down the distinction when a tax statute is involved 
in this area of constitutional law at the end of this same page, 
by declaring: 
Be that as it may, exemption from a tax stands 
upon a different footing, though the purpose of the 
tax is the upkeep of the highway. At such times the 
legislature may go far in apportioning and classifying 
to the end that public burdens may be distributed in 
accordance with its own conception of policy and jus-
tice. H its action be not arbitrary, the courts will 
stand aloof. · 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
Continental Baking Company v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 
352, 76 L.ed 1155; not only is a tax revenue case, but the 
agricultural exemption is distinguished by the court itself at 
76 L. ed. 1167 when it points out that "the exemption runs 
only to one who is carrying his own livestock and fann prod-
ucts to market or supplies for his own use in his own motor 
vehicle." 
It is obvious that any decision of a lower Federal 
Court, such as Schwartzman Service, Inc. vs. Stahl, 60 Fed. 
2d 1034, is not to be given undue weight by counsel attempt-
ing to distinguish a U.S. Supreme Court decision. 
Anderson v. Thomas, Commissioner of Public Utilities, 
26 P 2d 60, Kelly v. Finney 207 Ind. 557, 194 N.E. 157; Ex 
Parte Iratacable, 55 Nev. 263, 30 P. 2d 284; Hicklin v. Covey, 
290 U.S. 169, 78 L Ed 247 are all to be distinguished tax 
revenue cases and as otherwise distinguished hereinbefore. 
The cases cited by Appellants involving constitutional-
ity of various Sunday closing laws of the various states, surely 
have no application in these proceedings. Entirely different 
policy considerations are apparent when a State establishes a 
social policy having religious overtones, and when, as here, 
it regulates, or excepts from regulation a business enterprise 
serving the public as a common carrier. 
Appellants infers that, the staute under question is valid, 
too, because federal law pertaining to motor carriers contains 
some exemptions or exclusions similar to those contained in 
the Utah Motor Carrier Act. Obviously there is a distinction 
between Federal and State legislation. The "due process" 
clause of the Fifth Amendment (Federal action), unlike 
the Fourteenth Amendment (State action), contains no 
equal protection clause. In Sunshine Anthracite Coal Com· 
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ptmy vs. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 84 L.ed. 1263, the court 
summarily rejected a ''claim of discrimination" with the 
remark that, "the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, 
has no equal protection clause," citing Steward Machine 
Company v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 81 LEd 1279. 
The virility of Smith v. Cahoon is demonstrated by 
.\Iorey r. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 1 L.ed. 2d 1485, which in-
volved a construction of the Community Currency Ex-
changt's Act. The act required a state license from those issu-
ing money orders in Illinois, and otherwise regulated their 
operations. The American Express Company was excepted 
from the provisions of the act and, for that reason the act's 
constitutionality was duly challenged. At 1 L.ed. 2d 1491 
the court referred to Smith vs. Cahoon and stated: 
0 0 0 the act (in Smith v. Cahoon) excepted motor 
vehicles carrying specified products. This court held 
that the exception violated the Equal Protection 
Clause since the statutory purpose of protecting the 
public did not reasonably support a discrimination be-
tween the carrying of exempt products like farm pro-
duce and of regulated products like groceries. "Such 
a classification is not based on anything having rela-
tion to the purpose for which it is made." Ibid 283 
u.s. 567. 
0 0 0 
The principles controlling in the Smith and Hartford 
Co. cases, both supra, are applicable here. 
. Appellants reference to Railway Express Agency v. New 
l ork, 336 U.S. 106, 93 L.ed. 533, to indicate a restricted scope 
of Smith t:. Cahoon, fails to take cognizance of its strength 
when the opinion declares: 
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In (Smith v. Cahoon) o o o a motor vehicle regula-
tion was struck down upon citation of many author-
ities because 'such a classification is not based on 
anything having relation to the purpose for which it is 
made.' If that were the situation here, I should think 
we should reach a similar conclusion. 
The question before the court was the constitutionality of a 
city ordinance prohibiting advertising upon the business 
vehicles involved. This involved freedom of speech and is 
a far different situation than presented by the case at bar. 
The exceptions of Section 54-6-12 are unreasonably dis-
criminatory and, in your language in Justice v. Standard Gil-
sonite Co., 12 Utah 2d 357, 366 P.2d 974, involve an "exclu-
sion" which is "arbitrary and has no reasonable justification 
in fact.'' For convenience, portions of the opinion in the 
Justice case are set forth: 
We have carefully reconsidered this problem and 
notwithstanding our previous holding in the Walker 
case, we conclude that there is no reasonable basis 
for exclusion of banks and mercantile houses from the 
penalty provisions of this act as distinguished from 
other employers which are included, and that such 
provisions are thus rendered unconstitutional 
o o o So we conclude that this classification exclud-
ing banks and mercantile houses from the penalty pro-
visions of this chapter is arbitrary and has no reason· 
able justification in fact. 
Respondent is unable to comprehend any proper justifi· 
cation reasonably related to the purposes of the Motor Car· 
rier Act why trucks hauling oil, for instance, from the well-
head to the refinery, or ores from the mine to the mill or 
market, should be subject to general regulation of the Appel· 
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lant Commission, while on the other hand, trucks hauling 
coal, lumber or logs to shipping point or market are exempt. 
Ot hl'r illustrations are readily apparent by reading Section 
54-6-12 and in comparing the exhibits attached to the Stipu-
lation on file herein, between the parties ( R.22-44). For 
instance, what is the basis for regulating "commercial papers" 
and "negotiable securities" used in a bank, ( R.38, 43), but 
l'Xl'mpting "money and valuables" in an armored car? (Sec-
tion 54-6-12 (b) This is certainly class legislation. The 
exceptions from general regulation of the motor carrier act 
result in improper class legislation. Said classifications do not 
lwar a reasonable relationship to the objectives sought to be 
accomplished by this statute, as set forth in Chapter 6, Title 
54. 
Section 54-6-1 contains a catch-all definition to the effect 
that every motor carirer, for hire, is either a common or con-
tract carrier, subject to general regulation. Section 54-6-2 
purports to declare that all motor carriers, for hire, are 
subject to regulation of all rates and charges. A showing of 
public convenience and necessity, based upon a hearing and 
proper findings and conclusions of the Commission, is re-
quired by Sections 54-6-5 and -8. Nevertheless, Section 
54-6-12 removes the necessity for certain favored carriers to 
comply with these requirements, whereas Respondent must 
comply or be subject to penalties and criminal citations. 
The conclusions of the trial court are amply substanti-
ated and the Motor Carrier Act is unconstitutional not only 
tmder the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States of America and Article 1 Section 7, but also under 
similar provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
For instance, as stated in People vs. Western Fruit 
Growers, ............ Calif ............. , 140 P.2d 13, 19: 
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In the leading case in this state on the question 
of the distinction between a general and special law, 
the court declared that a law is a general one when 
it applies equally to all persons embraced in a class 
founded upon some natural, intrinsic, or constitutional 
distinction; on the other hand, it is special legislation 
if it confers particular privileges, or imposes peculiar 
disabilities or burdensome conditions, in the exercise 
of a common right, upon a class of persons arbitrarily 
selected from the general body of those who stand in 
precisely the same relation to the subject of the law. 
City of Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal 238, 251, 252, 
27 P. 604; and see Ray v. Parker, supra; Jersey Maid 
Milk Products Co., Inc. v. Brock, supra; Frank v. 
Maguire, 201 Cal. 414, 257 P. 515; Martin v. Superior 
Court, 194 Cal. 93, 227 P. 762; Reclamation Dist. 
No. 1500 v. Riley, 192 Cal. 147, 218 P. 762; In re 
Sumida, 177 Cal. 388, 170 P. 823; Ex parte Stolten-
berg, 165 Cal. 789, 134 P. 971; Matter of Miller, 162 
Cal. 687, 124 P. 427. Under this rule, it is apparent 
that the constitutional prohibition of special legisla-
tion does not preclude legislative classification but 
only requires that the classification be reasonable. In 
re Willing, 12 Cal. 2d 591, 86 P. 2d 663; Barker Bros., 
Inc., v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 603, 76 P. 2d 
97; In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 12 P. 2d 446; Sea-
board Acceptance Corp. v. Shay, 214 Cal. 361, 5 P. 2d 
882; Watson v. Division of Mat or Vehicles, 212 Cal. 
279, 298 P. 481; Bacon Service Corp. v. Huss, 199 Cal. 
21, 248 P. 235. 
Problems of classification under the California 
constitution are thus similar to those presented by the 
federal equal protection of the laws clause of the 14th 
Amendment. (Emphasis added) 
The Utah Constitution also is similar. 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ESTOPPED TO CHAL-
LENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
MOTOR CARRIER ACT. 
Section 78-33-2 UCA 1953, clearly authorizes a declara-
tory judgment proceeding to determine the constitutionality 
of a statute, as follows: 
Any person ° 0 0 whose rights, status or other legal 
relations are affected by a statute, 0 0 0 may have 
determined any question of construction or validity 
arising under the 0 0 0 statute 0 0 0 • 
In PHI KAPPA IOTA Fraternity vs. Salt Lake City, 116 
Ut. 536, 212 Pac. 2d 177, and Gray vs. Defa, 103 Utah 339, 
135 Pac. 2d 251, it has been held that declaratory relief is 
available to question the constitutionality of ordinances and 
statutes. Appellants completely ignore the effect of the Utah 
Declaratory Judgment Act and all of the cases cited in Ap-
pelants' Brief are to be distinguished. Cases under the Fed-
eral declaratory judgment act are not apposite because of 
the "case or controversy" requirements of the U.S. Constitu-
tion and due to the fact that the Federal act does not con-
tain the following: 
78-33-12 Chapter to be liberally construed. This 
chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to 
settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecur-
ity with respect to rights, status and other legal rela-
tions; and is to be liberally construed and admin-
istered. 
The annotation at 17 4 ALR 549, "Interest Necessary to 
~laintenance of Declaratory Determination of Validity of 
Statute or Ordinance," states the general rule here applicable: 
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Persons engaged in occupations or professions subject 
to r~gulation by statute or. ordinance are generally 
considered to have a sufficient interest to maintain 
a declaratory judgment action testing the validity of 
the statute or ordinance. (Page 560; see also page 
558.) 
The cases cited by Appellants correctly state a rule which 
is not applicable here. There are well known exceptions to 
the rule relied upon by Appellants, although some courts 
have apparently differed, as recognized in 11 American Juris-
prudence 771, "Constitutional Law, Section 124": 
~ ~ ~ The mere fact that one wishing to operate 
motor vehicles for hire on an interstate highway ap-
plies to the state officials for a certificate, as required 
by a state statute, does not prevent his assailing the 
statute as unconstitutional in case the certificate is 
denied. Similarly, securing a license under a statute 
does not estop one from questioning the validity of the 
statute, although as to this point some courts have 
reached a contrary conclusion. ~ ~ ~ 
Courts are properly restrictively circumspect to require 
an adequate justicible interest in a party who challenges the 
constitutionality of a statute. As stated in 13 American Juris-
prudence 393, "Licenses," Section 85: 
Who May Question Validity or Administration of 
License Law - In accordance with the general rule 
that only those adversely affected by legisla~on can 
question its validity, the court will not consider an 
objection to the validity of a license law when made 
by one whose rights are not injuriously affected ther~­
by, and one may not complain that a license .law IS 
invalid as against a class other than to which he 
belongs. ~ -o -o 
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When a statute, valid upon its face, requires the issue 
of a license or a certificate as a condition precedent 
to carrying on a business or following a vocation, one 
who is within the terms of the statute, but has failed 
to make the required application, is not at liberty to 
complain of the invalidity of the statute. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In other words, only a person with sufficient interest has 
standing to raise a constitutional question. This rule is stated 
with plainness at 11 American Jurisprudence 755, "Consti-
tutional Law," Section 111: 
The general rule that in order to attack the con-
stitutionality of a statute a person must show sufficient 
interest in himself applies with full force to attempted 
attacks upon the constitutionality of acts of the de-
partments of government. It is an established prin-
ciple that for a private individual to be entitled to 
invoke the judicial power to determine the validity 
of executive or legislative action, he must show that 
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sus-
taining a direct injury as a result of that action; it is 
not sufficient that he has merely a general interest 
common to all members of the public. 
This rule is amplified and clarified at 11 American Juris-
prudence 7 48: 
One of the elementary doctrines of constitutional 
law, finnly established by the authorities, is that ·the 
constitutionality of a legislative act is open to attack 
only by a person whose rights are affected thereby. 
Before a law can be assailed by any person on the 
ground that it is unconstitutional, he must show that 
he has an interest in the question in that the enforce-
ment of the law would be an infringement on his 
rights. Assailants must therefore show the appliciabil-
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ity of the statute and that they are thereby injuriously 
affected. 
and in 11 American Jurisprudence 759: 
A person who is seeking to raise the question as to 
the validity of a discriminatory statute has no stand-
ing for that purpose unless he belongs to the class 
which is prejudiced by the statute. 
It is submitted that to test the constitutionality of the 
Motor Carrier Act it would be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible to do so, unless one were a licensed motor carrier. 
This is indicated in 33 American Jurisprudence 393, "Li-
censes," Section 85: 
When a statute, valid upon its face, requires the issue 
of a license or certificate as a condition precedent to 
carrying on a business or following a vocation, one 
who is within the terms of the statute, but has failed 
to make the required application, is not at liberty to 
complain of the invalidity of the statute or because of 
his anticipation of improper or invalid action in ad-
ministration. # # # When, however, the statute is in-
valid upon its face and an attempt is made to enforce 
its penalties against such person in violation of his 
constitutional rights, the question of validity is neces-
sarily presented. 
An excellent annotation entitled "Right to Attack Valid-
ity of Statute, Ordinance or Regulation Relating to Occu· 
pational or Professional License as Affected by Applying for, 
or Securing License" appears at 65 A.L.R. 2d 660. 
The quotation from 65 ALR 2d 664 in Appellants' Brief, 
beginning on page 6, omits the following portions of the 
material quotated in Respondent's Memorandum for the 
trial court ( R. 63) : 
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Excepting situations in which the attack is made 
in proceedings in which it is sought to obtain the 
license, it seems that a person is not, merely by apply-
ing for a license, precluded from attacking the valid-
ity of the licensing law. The mere fact that a license 
had been issued to a party without an application on 
his part for a license and that the party had complied 
with the conditions of the license has been held not 
to estop him from afterward attacking the validity of 
such condition. 
While in some cases an attack on the validity of 
a licensing law as a whole has been held premissible, 
even though it was made by one who had obtained a 
license under the law, there are other cases indicating 
that such an attack may not be directed at the licens-
ing law as a whole, but may be directed at specific 
provisions thereof. On the other hand, it cannot be 
said that an attack on specific provisions of the licens-
ing law is always permissible; in particular, it has 
been uniformly held that a licensee may not attack 
the validity of provisions for fees or taxes contained 
in the licensing law. The courts are not in agreement 
as to whether a person is, by obtaining a professional 
or occupational license, precluded from attacking the 
validity of an administrative regulation issued under 
the licensing law. It has been uniformly held that the 
obtaining of a license does not prevent the licensee 
from challenging the validity of a provision of the 
licensing law enacted after his application for a li-
cense under an earlier statute has been granted. 
It is of interest that a distinction is drawn when pay-
ment of a tax or license fee is involved as an issue. Appel-
lants' inadvertently cut off the last portion of the quota-
tion from 65 ALR 2d, and the period after the word ''liti-
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gant" should be a comma so that the last sentence reads as 
follows: 
Some of the courts, in holding whether an attack was 
not permissible, have emphasized that the application 
for the license was the voluntary act of the litigant, 
while other courts, in reaching the opposite result as 
to the permissibility o1 the attack, have emphasized 
that in view of the penalties prescribed in the licens-
ing law for acting without license, the application for 
the license was not the voluntary act of the litigant. 
(Emphasis supplied. ) 
At page 668 of 65 ALR 2d some of the cases are set 
forth in which an attack on the validity of the licensing law 
as a whole has been held proper against allegations of estop-
pel, even though made by one who had obtained a license 
under the law. 
One of these is Southern Motorways, Inc. v. Perry, 39 
Fed. 2d 145. This was a suit in equity challenging the con-
stitutionality of the Georgia Motor Carrier Act and to enjoin 
its enforcement. This case apparently preceded enactment of 
the declaratory judgment acts, but it recognized some of the 
problems that exist through application of the estoppel doc-
trine here asserted by Appellants, when it concluded at 
page 148: 
It would be unfortunate practically to have some of 
these carriers regulated through estoppel and others 
unregulated because of a successful attack upon the 
regulations. 
Schwegmann Bros. vs. Louisiana Board of A.B.C., 216 
La. 148, 43 So. 2d 248, 14 ALR 2d 680, puts this entire matter 
into proper perspective when, at pages 687 and 688 of 14 
ALR 2d, the Court stated: 
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o o • appellants contend that as a licensee plaintiff 
has no right (it is estopped) to attack the starnte 
undn which it holds a permit. 
This contention, in which we find no merit, has 
as its basis the doctrine of waiver or estoppel to 
assert the invalidity of a law. But essential to that 
doctrine is the element of voluntary action which is 
completely lacking here, resulting in the case falling 
within one of the frequently occurring exceptions. 
In 11 American Jurisprudence verbo Constitutional 
Law, Section 124, it is said: "The most important and 
frequent class of exceptions to the general doctrine of 
waiV('r or estoppel to assert the invalidity of a law is 
that where a statute requires a duty which is manda-
tory in fmm, accompanied by penalties for failure to 
obey its provisions, or is otherwise coercive. In such 
cases the element of voluntary action essential to 
waiver or estoppel is absent o 0 0 " 
0 0 0 
True, the appellee here did not make application 
for its permit as a consequence of an injunction or a 
threatened seizure. A sort of coercion, however, at-
tended the obtaining of it, for appellee was required 
by the statu.te to be licensed (if it operated) on pain 
of receiving criminal penalties and of the closure of 
its business. • o o 
To hold applicable the doctrine of estoppel in a 
case of this kind would be to place the liquor dealer 
in a two-homed dilemma, from the choosing of either 
hom of which detriment might result to him. Thus, if 
he refuses to apply for the license, maintaining that 
certain statutory conditions surrounding its issuance 
violate his constihitional rights, he may be severely 
penalized; if, on the other hand, he secures the permit 
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he is denied the right of attacking the constitutionality 
of the statutory conditions. 
But the law does not prevent such an attack. The 
United States Supreme Court has said specifically that 
the acceptance of a required statutory license does not 
impose an the licensee an obligation to respect or to 
comply with any provisions of the statute that are 
repugnant to the constitution. Cargill Company v. 
State of Mtnnesota ex rel. Railroad & Warehouse 
Commission, 180 U.S. 452, 21 S Ct 423,45 L. Ed 619. 
And the soundness of this view cannot be denied. The 
immunization of a law from constitutional attack by 
the simple expedient of requiring licenses from those 
in a business sought to be regulated clearly would be 
inharmonious with our American system of checks and 
balances. (Emphasis added. ) 
In 1921, the Utah Supreme Court recognized this same 
principle in Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 58 
Utah 314, 199 Pac. 152, 153: 
The fundamental distinction between these cases and 
the case at bar consists in the fact that the plaintiff 
in the instant case cannot be said to have accepted 
that provision of the law which it now asserts is un-
constitutional. Neither has it received any benefit 
therefrom; hence it is difficult to see wherein the doc-
trine of estoppel can apply. In fact, it cannot be con-
tended that plaintiff has voluntarily accepted any 
provision of the Industrial Act, for the act has been 
held to be compulsory. 
The quotation from Fahey vs. Mallonee, 332 US 245,91 
L. ed. 2031, is quoted in full at the beginning of the annota· 
tion at 65 ALR 2d 660 referred to above. It should be noted 
that the quotation is contained in the dissenting opinion of 
Justice Brandeis, who concurred in the result on this one 
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point, and said quotation is pure dictum. Ashwander vs. 
TV~\, 297 US 288, 348, 80 L ed 688, 711 contains the material 
quoted, but at page 698 of 80 L Ed, the majority opinion 
states: 
The Government urges that the Power Company is 
estopped to question the validity of the Act creating 
the Tennessee Valley Authority and hence the stock-
holders, suing in the right of the corporation, cannot 
maintain this suit. (Citing cases. ) We think that the 
principle is not applicable here. (Emphasis fur-
nished.) 
Salt Lake City Lines vs. Salt Lake City, 6 Ut 2d 428, 
315 Pac 2d 859, is readily distinguished from the instant case. 
The case involved a revenue tax based on gross revenues 
contained in a Salt Lake City ordinance. The tax challenged 
by Salt Lake City Lines had clearly been a condition prec-
edent to the issuance of the franchise inasmuch as the same 
ordinance approving the transfer to the plaintiff contained 
the license tax on intracity passenger transportation. The 
bus company was properly estopped. 
All of the other cases are distinguishable on grounds 
already set forth herein. One of these, Gregory vs. H ecke, 
73 Cal App 268, 238 Pac 787, has been distinguished by a 
later California Appellate Court in People vs. Western Fruit 
Growers, 129 Pac 2d 53, where, at page 54, it concluded its 
opinion as follows: 
Plaintiff and the cross-defendants contend, fur-
ther, that defendant here is estopped to dispute the 
validity of the license, relying upon the staetment in 
Gregory v. Heeke, 1925, 73 Cal App 268, 284, 238 P 
787, 794, that "One who elects to accept the benefits 
of a statute fs estopped from denying its validity." 
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0 0 0 It appears that over a considerable period of 
time, before this action was begun, defendant applied 
for and received such quotas and it is these acts 
which, its adversaries claim, estop it from objecting 
to the validity of the license. But in so acting defend-
ant was confronted with section 7 of the 1935 act 
which made is a misdemeanor, punishable by a mini-
mum fine of $50 or a minimum imprisonment of 10 
days, or by both, to violate any provision of a state 
license, and declared, "Each day any of the violations 
above referred to shall continue shall constitute a sep-
arate offense." The same penalty provision appeared 
in the 1937 act, Section 14. Under the statutory 
scheme defendant became subject to the license and 
therefore liable for its violation, upon its promulga-
tion, without any affirmative act on its part. Compli-
ance with the license in the face of such penalties and 
under such circumstances does not work an estoppel 
to dispute its validity. (Emphasis added. ) 
Section 54-6-18 Utah Code Annotated 1953 specifies that 
every violation of the Motor Carirer Act is a misdemeanor, 
and Section 54-7-25 stipulates that every violation of Title 
54 "or of any order, decision, decree, rule, demand, or re-
quirement, or any part or provision thereof, of the Commis-
sion ° 0 0 is a separate and distinct defense and, in case of 
a continuing violation, each day's continuance thereof shall 
be a separate and distinct offense." 
Respondent is not estopped to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the Utah Motor Carriers Act. On the contrary, 
only someone in its position has sufficient standing to com-
plain, as indicated in the next Point. 
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POINT III 
RESPONDENT HAS THE REQUISITE JUSTI-
CIABLE INTEREST TO CHALLENGE THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MOTOR CAR-
RIER ACT AND BELONGS TO THE CLASS 
ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE DISCRIM-
INATORY EXCEPTIONS THERETO. 
Appellants have correctly stated broad general prin-
ciples, but Respondent submits same have not been cor-
rectly applied to the facts of this case. 
In the first place, their entire argument is inapplicable, 
for the reason that Respondent is patently harmed by the 
tmreasonable discriminations created by the exceptions from 
general regulation of motor carrier transportation, for hire, 
under the Motor Carrier Act. It should also be remembered 
that Respondent contends that the entire Motor Carrier Act 
is unconstitutional. How can anyone claim that a regulated 
motor carrier is not adversely affected? A more complete dis-
cussion of the differences between a regulated and an exempt 
motor carrier has been detailed under Point I of this brief. 
The discrimination extends further than merely to the free-
dom to haul certain commodities without the necessity of 
proving public convenience and necessity at a contested 
public hearing. It also includes the right to conduct busi-
ness without constant bureaucratic regulation. (See sample 
list on page 7 of this brief of the differences between the 
two types of motor carriers. ) 
Appellants also contend that Respondent does not have 
sufficient interest to bring this suit. The principle involved 
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here is stated at 11 American Jurisprudence 755, "Constitu-
tional Law," Section 111: 
The general rule that in order to attack the con-
stitutionality of a statute a person must show sufficient 
interest in himself applies with full force to attempted 
attacks upon the constitutionality of acts of the de· 
partments of government. It is an established prin-
ciple that for a private individual to be entitled to 
invoke t'ne judicial power to determine the validity of 
executive or legislative action, he must show that he 
has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustain-
ing a direct mjury as a result of that action; it is not 
sufficient that he has merely a general interest com-
mon to all members of the public. 
The statement on page 4 of Appellants' Brief that the 
Appellant Commission has assessed a penalty against Re-
spondent in the amount of $18,500.00 "for violations of the 
Motor Carrier Act," in and of itself is sufficient evidence that 
Respondent is in danger of sustaining injury under the Act. 
Appellants in their answer also admitted that they have 
caused criminal citations to be issued against Respondent 
and Respondent's employees for alleged failure to comply 
with the Motor Carrier Act. (R.3 Par. 7; R. 17, Par. 2). 
An analysis of the cases relied upon by Appellants indi· 
cates the substantial diff~rence on the facts between such 
cited cases and the case at bar: 
Tileston v. Ullman, 318 US 44, involved a physician who 
attacked a statute which made unlawful the giving of advice 
in the use of contraceptives. The court correctly held that 
he had insufficient standing to raise this question, and that 
only the patients could challenge the statute. 
In Jeffrey Manufacturing Co. vs. Blagg, 235 US 571, it 
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was held that the employer, who attempted to attack a 
Workmen's Compensation statute that applied only to em-
ployers with more than five employees, did not have suffi-
cient standing to raise the question of an unconstitutional 
discrimination. The decision is clearly correct that only an 
excluded employee could raise this question. 
State v. H citz, ...... Idaho ...... , 238 Pac 2d 439, involved 
a criminal proceeding where the defendant was convicted of 
driving an overweight truck. Defendant challenged the 
constitutionality, not only of the provision under which he 
was convicted, but of other provisions of the penal code. The 
Court properly concluded that he did not have standing to 
attack the constitutionality of any section except the one 
under which he was being prosecuted. 
Bode, ct al v. Barrett, et al, 344 US 583, 97 L. ed. 567, 
involved the constitutionality of a gross weight tax statute. 
The Court held the plaintiff could not complain of nine pro-
visions of the Act not directly affecting plaintiff. 
None of authorites cited by Appellants is applicable to 
this case. Respondent clearly has standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Motor Carrier Act. 
POINT IV 
THE EXEMPriONS OF THE MOTOR CAR-
RIER ACT RENDER THE ENTIRE ACT UN-
CONSTITUTIONAL 
The judgment of the trial court in declaring invalid all 
of Chapter 6, Title 54, UCA 1953, should be sustained for 
at least one of two reasons: 
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1. The legislature would not have enacted the statute 
without the exclusion of the enumerated classes. 
2. The Motor Carrier Act has no severability clause in-
asmuch as it was repealed with the adoption of the 1953 
Utah Code Annotated, but such a clause would not save 
this legislation. 
The cases cited at 11 American Jurisprudence 855 are 
too numerous to be cited here. The proposition, however, 
bears repeating: 
One important class of cases in which questions as to 
the severability of valid and invalid portions of an act 
and the determination of the legislative intent are in-
volved consists of statutes containing invalid excep-
tions or provisis. The general rule is that if such pro-
viso operates to limit the scope of the act in such a 
manner that by striking out the proviso, the remainder 
of the statute would have a broader scope either as 
to subject or territory, then the whole act is invalid, 
because such extended operation would not be in ac-
cordance with the legislative intent. (See Frost v. 
Corporation Commission 278 US 515, 73 L Ed 483 
and other cases cited at 11 Am. Jur. 855) (Emphasis 
mine.) 
Continuing at 11 American Jurisprudence 856: 
In all such cases the exception of a particular group 
from the provisions of a general statute may ha~e 
been a material consideration with the legislature m 
the passage of the act, and the courts may p~operly 
infer that it would not have been enacted if such 
group had not been excluded from its operation and 
protected from its provision. 
Although the Utah Motor Act, when adopted in 1935 as 
Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, contained a severability 
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clause (Section 25 ), as quoted on page 40 of Appellant's 
Brid, this clause has hccn repealed and is no longer law. 
AmendatorY ads have also contained severability clauses, 
but obviou~ly these applied only to the particular acts then 
before the legislature. Section 68-1-9 UCA 1953 reads as 
follows: 
The statute books consisting of ten volumes known as 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, duly certified by the 
Governor 0 0 o is approved, adopted and legalized 
as to arrangement of said compilation by Title, Chap-
ter, Article and Section for the purpose of amendment 
or repeal of, or additions to any statute compiled 
therein in whole or in part by reference thereto. 
Respondent feels that Appellants are reading things into 
Justin• v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 12 Utah 2d 357, 366 P. 2d 
974. which the case does not stand for. 
Nowhere can Respondent see where the court was asked to 
determine whether the exclusion of more than "banks and 
mercantile houses" was unconstitutional The opinion ob-
sern's that the question presented is whether their exclusion 
makes the act arbitrary, discriminatory class legislation. 
Contrary to the argument of Appellants, the argument could 
also be made that there is no specific showing of evidence as 
to the evidence of banks and mercantile houses that the 
legislature is arbitrary in excluding them from the operation 
of the statute. Without knowing, this writer is of the opinion 
that the matter of banks and mercantile houses may have 
been the only objection urged upon the court, and that no 
more can or should be written into the decision. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the trial court's judgment contains 
no error and should be affirmed. 
WAYNE C. DURHAM 
Att()Tney f()T Respondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
